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This paper investigates the role of discount rate heterogeneity for wealth inequality. The key 
idea is to infer the distribution of preference parameters from the observed age profile of 
wealth inequality. The contribution of preference heterogeneity to wealth inequality can then 
be measured using a quantitative life-cycle model. 
I find that discount rate heterogeneity increases the Gini coefficient of wealth by 0.06 to 0.11. 
The share of wealth held by the richest 1% of households rises by 0.03 to 0.13. The larger 
changes occur when altruistic bequests are large and when preferences are strongly persistent 
across generations. Discount rate heterogeneity also helps account for the large wealth 
inequality observed among households with similar lifetime earnings. 
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A large literature studies wealth inequality in the context of quantitatively life-cycle models. These
studies highlight the importance of earnings shocks, bequests, and entrepreneurship.1
A more recent branch of this literature suggests that preference heterogeneity may be an im-
portant source of wealth inequality. This is motivated by the ￿nding that observationally similar
households hold very di⁄erent amounts of wealth.2 For example, Venti and Wise (2000) study
wealth inequality at the outset of retirement among households with similar lifetime earnings and
conclude "that the bulk of the dispersion must be attributed to di⁄erences in the amount that
households choose to save" (p. 1).
Household survey data support the notion of preference heterogeneity. Empirical estimates of
consumption Euler equations indicate heterogeneity in time preferences (Lawrance 1991) and in risk
aversion coe¢ cients or intertemporal substitution elasticities (Vissing-Jorgenson 2002; Attanasio
and Browning 1995). Substantial heterogeneity is also found in survey data that are designed to
reveal households￿preference parameters (Barsky et al. 1997; Charles and Hurst 2003).
The potential importance of preference heterogeneity for wealth inequality is highlighted by
Krusell and Smith (1998). In their model, a "small" amount of discount rate heterogeneity leads
to large increases in wealth inequality (the Gini coe¢ cient increases by 0.57).
The objective of this paper is to measure the importance of preference heterogeneity for wealth
inequality.
The approach. The main di¢ culty in addressing this issue is how preference parameters can be
inferred from data on consumption and saving behavior. The key idea of the paper is to exploit
that preference heterogeneity a⁄ects how wealth inequality changes with age.
To illustrate the intuition underlying this approach, consider a life-cycle model in which the
permanent income hypothesis holds and agents are identical except for their discount factors.
Patient households choose steeper age-consumption pro￿les and accumulate more retirement wealth
than do impatient households. As a result, wealth inequality, at least among the old, increases with
the dispersion of discount rates in a way that can be exploited to infer the distribution of preference
parameters.
Based on this idea, I measure the importance of preference heterogeneity for wealth inequality
as follows. I develop a quantitative life-cycle model of the kind that has been used previously
to study the wealth distribution. The model is based on Huggett￿ s (1996) benchmark study and
features ￿nitely lived households who are subject to uninsured earnings and mortality risk. At
birth, each household is endowed with a discount rate that depends stochastically on parental
preferences. Preferences are constant over an individual￿ s lifetime.3 The distribution of discount
rates is chosen to replicate how wealth inequality changes with age in U.S. data. Comparing
the equilibria of models with and without preference heterogeneity o⁄ers a measure of how much
preference heterogeneity contributes to wealth inequality.
Findings. I ￿nd that preference heterogeneity has a far smaller e⁄ect on the wealth distribution
than Krusell and Smith￿ s (1998) results suggest. In the absence of intended bequests, the Gini
coe¢ cient of wealth increases by around 0:06, from 0:70 to 0:76. The fraction of wealth held by the
richest 1% of households rises by around 0:04, but still falls more than 10 percentage points short
of the data. Thus, preference heterogeneity makes only a modest contribution towards accounting
for the largest wealth observations, which pose a challenge for many life-cycle models (Castaneda
1Examples include Huggett (1996), Laitner (2002), Castenda et al. (2003), and De Nardi (2004).
2See Hurst et al. (1998), Venti and Wise (2000), Charles and Hurst (2003), Knowles and Postlewaite (2003).
3Models of habit formation are an alternative with time varying preferences (Diaz et al. 2002).
2et al. 2003).
Altruistic bequests magnify the e⁄ects of discount rate heterogeneity. In my preferred calibra-
tion with altruism, the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth increases by 0:11 and the fraction of wealth held
by the richest 1% of households rises by 0:13. In this case, preference heterogeneity allows the
model to come close to replicating the wealth concentration observed in U.S. data, including the
large wealth holdings of the richest households. Even larger changes are possible if preferences are
highly persistent across generations. However, the model then overstates intergenerational wealth
persistence and overall wealth inequality.
How much altruism magni￿es the e⁄ects of discount rate heterogeneity depends on the degree
of intergenerational preference persistence. The intuition is that patient, altruistic families can
accumulate large amounts of wealth over several generations. For this to happen, parents must
be su¢ ciently altruistic to desire large bequests. In addition, families must contain successive
generations of patient individuals who can build up large estates.
In all cases, discount rate heterogeneity has far smaller e⁄ects on wealth inequality than the
￿ndings of Krusell and Smith (1998) suggest. The reason is that households in their model do
not retire and face only small, transitory earnings shocks. Even small degrees of discount rate
heterogeneity then imply large amounts of wealth inequality. By contrast, if households face realistic
amounts of earnings risk, even impatient households hold substantial precautionary wealth. The
wealth distribution is then far less sensitive to discount rate heterogeneity.
One challenge for existing life-cycle models is to account for the large degree of wealth dispersion
among households with similar lifetime earnings observed in U.S. data (Venti and Wise 2000;
Hendricks 2004). Preference heterogeneity substantially improves the model￿ s ability to account
for this observation. It also enables the life-cycle model to generate age pro￿les of wealth inequality
that are quite close to the data. Both ￿ndings suggest that discount rate heterogeneity may be an
important determinant of savings behavior.
Literature. A number of previous studies have proposed quantitative models of inequality due to
preference heterogeneity. Krusell and Smith (1998) study an example with an arbitrary distribution
of discount rates. Samwick (1998) chooses the discount rate for each model agent to match one
wealth observation in the data. The contribution of this paper is to estimate the distribution of
preference parameters based on the observed age pro￿le of wealth inequality. Cagetti (2003) studies
precautionary saving in a model where preference parameters di⁄er between education groups. He
estimates preference parameters by matching the median age-wealth pro￿le for each group.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environment. The e⁄ects of
a small, arbitrary amount of discount rate heterogeneity are studied in section 3. The experiment
closely follows Krusell and Smith (1998), but yields a strikingly di⁄erent result. Section 4 de-
scribes the approach for estimating preference parameters and discusses how the implied preference
heterogeneity a⁄ects the distribution of wealth.
2 The Model
The economic environment is a version of the stochastic incomplete markets life-cycle model com-
monly used to study the wealth distribution (e.g., Huggett 1996). The economy is inhabited by a
continuum of households of unit mass, by a single representative ￿rm, and by a government. All
markets are competitive and the economy is in steady state.
2.1 Households
Demographics. A household lives for at most aD periods. Households work for the ￿rst aR
periods and then retire. Ps (a) denotes the probability of surviving from age a to a+1. Upon death,
3a household is replaced by a child of age 1 who inherits the parent￿ s wealth. The child￿ s realizations
of preference parameters and labor endowments are correlated with the parent￿ s realizations.
Labor endowments. While of working age, households inelastically supply l = h(a) e units
of labor to the market, where h(a) is a deterministic age-e¢ ciency pro￿le. e denotes a labor
endowment shocks which is governed by the Markov transition matrix Pe. When the household
retires, he keeps his last labor endowment until death.
A new agent￿ s labor endowment (e1) depends stochastically on the parent￿ s e realization at age
aIG; it is governed by the Markov transition matrix Pe1. There are two reasons for deviating from
the more common assumption that e1 depends on the parent￿ s e at the age of death. First, the
transmission of human capital arguably occurs when the parent is middle aged, not at the time
of death. Secondly, the model cannot match the observed intergenerational persistence of lifetime
earnings, if labor endowments are transmitted too late in life (see Hendricks 2005 for details).
Preferences. At birth, a household is endowed with a discount factor ￿j which takes on J discrete
values. The household maximizes the expected discounted sum of period utilities over the lifetime





j u(ca) +  ￿^ aUc (1)
where ^ a is the realized age of death, c denotes consumption, and u(c) = c1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿). The
parameter   governs the strength of parental altruism. U and Uc are the parent￿ s and the child￿ s
indirect utility functions, which are de￿ned recursively by (1). The child￿ s preference draw is
governed by the transition matrix Pj (j;j0), which allows for the possibility of intergenerational
preference transmission.
Dynamic program. The problem solved by a household of type j may be written as a dynamic
program with state vector s = (a;k;e;j), where k is household wealth. The Bellman equation is
given by
V (s) = max
k0(s);c(s)
u(c) + ￿j Ps(a)
P
e0 Pe (e;e0) V (s0)
+￿j (1 ￿ Ps (a)) W (k0 (s);s)
(2)
subject to the budget constraint
k0(s) = (1 + r)k(s) + wl(s) ￿ c(s) + ￿(a): (3)
and the borrowing constraint k(s0) ￿ 0. Here, r is the (constant) rate of return to capital, w is the
after-tax wage rate, and ￿ (a) is a lump-sum transfer which depends only on age.
When the parent dies, the child receives an inheritance of (1 ￿ ￿b) k0 (s), where ￿b is the estate
tax rate. W denotes the expected utility obtained from leaving a bequest, conditional on the














1;(1 ￿ ￿b)k0 (s);e1;j0￿
(4)
To reduce the parent￿ s state vector, I assume that the parent cannot recall his labor endowment
history. When calculating the expected utility of the child, the probability distribution over the
child￿ s age 1 labor endowments, Pr(e1js), is therefore calculated from the current level of e, not
from the parent￿ s e at age aIG.
42.2 Firms
Output is produced from capital (K) and labor (L) using a constant returns to scale production
function F (K;L). The representative ￿rm maximizes period pro￿ts, F(K;L)￿qK K ￿qL L, where
qK and qL denote the rental prices for capital and labor, respectively.
2.3 Government
The government taxes labor income at a proportional rate and provides lump-sum transfers to
retired households. The wage tax rate is ￿w, so that the after-tax wage rate is given by w =
(1 ￿ ￿w)qL. Transfers are paid in equal amounts to all retired households. Hence, ￿ (a) = 0 if
a ￿ aR and ￿ (a) = ￿R otherwise, where ￿R is a constant. Aggregate transfer payments amount
to X =
R
￿(s)￿ (s) ds, where ￿(s) denotes the density of households over states. Denote the
aggregate bequest ￿ ow by B. Bequest tax revenues then amount to ￿bB. The di⁄erence between
tax revenues and transfer spending is used for government consumption (CG). The government
budget constraint is therefore
CG + X = ￿w qL L + B: (5)
2.4 Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium consists of aggregate quantities (K;L;C;CG;X;B), a price
system (w;r;qK;qL), a value function (V [s]), a policy function (c[s]), and a distribution over
household types, ￿(s), such that:
￿ The policy functions and the value function solve the household problem.
￿ Firms maximize pro￿ts.
￿ Markets clear.
￿ The government budget is balanced.
￿ The distribution of household types, ￿(s), is stationary.
￿ Household prices are given by w = (1 ￿ ￿w)qL and r = qK ￿ ￿.
The market clearing conditions are K =
R
￿(s)k(s)ds for capital, L =
R
￿(s)l(s)ds for labor,
and F(K;L)￿￿ K = C+CG for goods, where ￿ is the rate of depreciation. Aggregate consumption
is given by C =
R
￿(s)c(s)ds. The aggregate bequest ￿ ow, B, equals the savings of all households
who die in the current period.
2.5 Discussion
The model abstracts from a number of features that are present in some recent studies of wealth
inequality. The simplicity of the model is dictated by the computational cost of solving it. The
algorithm searches over transition matrices for preference parameters (Pj) until the model repli-
cates the calibration targets explained below. For each candidate Pj the stationary equilibrium is
computed. This involves solving a ￿xed point problem in the household value function for each
type j. Computing the results reported in the paper therefore takes more than 30 days of cpu
time on a state of the art personal computer. This computational complexity forces the model to
abstract from a number of potentially interesting extensions. These include:
￿ Retirement transfers could depend on the households￿income histories.
5￿ Generations could overlap and inheritances might be received at middle age rather than at
the beginning of life.
One bene￿t of abstracting from these features is that the model is similar to the well-understood
benchmark studied by Huggett (1996).
Preference heterogeneity takes the simplest possible form. Households are endowed with pref-
erence parameters that remain ￿xed over the entire lifespan and are uncorrelated with labor en-
dowments. These assumptions are common in the literature (e.g., Samwick 1998; Guvenen 2005).
Krusell and Smith (1998) model preferences as following a Markov chain, but interpret their model
as approximating a life-cycle model with age invariant preferences for individuals. Habit formation
o⁄ers one alternative where preference parameters are ￿xed, but the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is time-varying (Diaz et al. 2002).
2.6 Model Parameters
This section describes how the model parameters are chosen. In order to isolate how bequests
interact with preference heterogeneity I study three versions of the model:
1. In the no bequest model the government con￿scates all bequests: ￿b = 1.
2. In the accidental bequest model households are sel￿sh (  = 0) but may leave bequests acci-
dentally (￿b = 0).
3. In the altruistic model households care about their children (  = 1) and bequests are not
taxed (￿b = 0).
For each model, I consider several ways of estimating the distribution of preference parameters.
The details are explained below. All other parameters are common to all models and summarized
in table 1. Their choice follows the benchmark model of Huggett (1996).
Demographics. The model period is one year. Households are thought to enter the model at
age 22 and live at most until age 90 (aD = 69). Retirement occurs at age 64 (aR = 43). Mortality
rates are taken from the 1997 Social Security Life Tables.
Labor endowments. The mean age-productivity pro￿le h(a) is estimated from 1990 PUMS
data. The transition matrix for transitory labor endowments, Pe, approximates an autoregressive




= ￿ ln(e) + " (6)





on a 7 point grid. Processes of this type are commonly estimated in the
literature. The values of ￿ and ￿2
" are chosen to minimize the deviation between the variance of
log earnings implied by the model and the data reported by Storesletten et al. (2004) over the age
range 23 to 58.
New agents inherit labor endowments from their parents at parental age 40 (aIG = 19) according
to an autroregressive process of the form
ln(e1) = ￿c ln(eaIG) + "c (7)
with "c ￿ N(0;￿2
c). The parameters ￿c and ￿2
c are chosen to match the variance of log earnings
at age 22 reported by Storesletten et al. (2004) and an intergenerational persistence coe¢ cient for
the discounted present value of earnings over the work life of 0.4 (Solon 1992).
6Table 1: Model parameters
Demographics
aD = 69 Maximum lifetime (physical age 90)
aR = 43 Retirement age (physical age 64)
Ps Matches mortality rates of couples. Social Security Adminis-
tration, Period Life Tables 1997
Labor endoments
ne = 7 Size of labor endowment grid
￿ = 0:999 Persistence of labor endowments
V ar(￿) = 0:017 Variance of transitory shocks
￿c = 0:380 Intergenerational persistence of labor endowments
V ar(ec) = 0:154 Variance of age 1 endowment shock
aIG = 19 Age of intergenerational transmission (physical age 40)
Preferences
￿ = 1:5 Huggett (1996)
Technology
￿ = 0:36 Capital income share in NIPA
￿ = 0:076 Matches after-tax interest rate of 4 percent
A = 0:89 Normalized such that qL = 1
Government
￿w = 0:40 Trostel (1993)
￿R = 0:75 Replacement rate of 0.4
Notes: The table shows parameters that are common to all models and experiments. Preference
parameters vary by experiment and explained in the text.
Preferences. The curvature of the utility function is set to the conventional value of ￿ = 1:5.
For the strength of the altruistic bequest motive I consider two cases: sel￿sh parents (  = 0) and
parents who value the utility of their o⁄spring as much as their own (  = 1).
Technology. The production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form: F (K;L) = A K￿ L1￿￿.
The capital share parameter is set to the conventional value of 0:36. The parameters A and ￿ are
chosen such that the equilibrium factor prices are qL = 1 and r = 0:04.
Government. The wage tax rate is set to ￿w = 0:4 following Trostel (1993). Retirement transfers
amount to 40% of mean after-tax earnings per working household (De Nardi 2003). For the estate
tax rate I consider the values ￿b = 0 and ￿b = 1.
Since the data used to parameterize the model are taken from samples that fail to oversample
the rich, the model economy should be thought of as representing the lower 99% of the earnings
and wealth distribution (see Juster et al. 1999).
The following sections explore the implications of discount rate heterogeneity for wealth in-
equality. Section 3 replicates Krusell and Smith￿ s (1998) experiment. The main purpose is to study
how such heterogeneity a⁄ects the wealth distribution in a transparent setting. The paper￿ s main
￿ndings are presented in section 4, where the distribution of discount rates is estimated from data
on wealth inequality by age.
3 A Krusell and Smith Experiment
Krusell and Smith (1998; hereafter KS) study the role of discount rate heterogeneity for wealth
inequality in an in￿nite horizon model. They ￿nd that a "small" amount of preference heterogeneity
7increases the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth from 0.25 to 0.82. One interpretation of their result is: unless
households have essentially identical discount rates, preference heterogeneity makes an important
contribution to wealth inequality.
In this section I adopt their model of discount rate heterogeneity and study whether their
￿nding holds true in the model outlined in section 2. Following KS, I restrict ￿ to three values,









0 1 ￿ p1 p1
3
5 (8)
The value of p2 is chosen such that, in the stationary distribution, 80% of households are in state
j = 2: The parameter ￿ ￿ is chosen to match a capital-output ratio of 3.1. All other parameters are
determined as described in section 2.6. I label this experiment KS1.
Experiment KS1 di⁄ers from KS￿ s only in the way p1 is set. Krusell and Smith set p1 such that
the average duration of a preference state is 50 years (one generation). This cannot be replicated in
a life-cycle model. I therefore set p1 = 0:5 to allow for some intergenerational preference persistence.
The ￿ndings are not sensitive to this choice.
Wealth distribution. To measure the role of preference heterogeneity, I compute the model
economy with each bequest motive under homogeneous and heterogeneous discount rates. Except
for the values of ￿ ￿, which are shown in the last column of table 2, the economies share the same
parameters.
Table 2 compares the cross-sectional wealth distributions implied by the six model economies
with PSID data taken from Hendricks (2004). For each model economy the table shows points on
the Lorenz curve of wealth, the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth, and the ratio of aggregate bequests to
output (B=Y ). The statistics characterizing the PSID data are familiar from the literature. The
Gini coe¢ cient of 0.75 is smaller than the one obtained from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
This re￿ ects the fact that the PSID fails to over-sample rich households (Juster et al. 1999). One
￿nding that poses a challenge for life-cycle models is that the richest 1% of households hold nearly
one quarter of total wealth.4
Table 2: Wealth distribution. Experiment KS1.
40.0 60.0 80.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 Gini B/Y ￿ ￿
Data 1.1 7.7 24.2 40.5 54.4 75.6 0.75 2.6 n/a
No bequests 1.8 8.8 28.4 49.3 66.3 89.7 0.70 2.2 0.969
- No ￿ hetero 1.8 8.8 28.4 49.3 66.3 89.7 0.70 2.2 0.969
Accidental bequ. 1.9 9.5 29.9 50.9 68.0 90.4 0.69 1.9 0.962
- No ￿ hetero 1.9 9.5 29.9 50.9 68.0 90.5 0.69 1.9 0.962
Altruism 1.4 7.8 27.6 49.3 67.4 90.6 0.70 4.0 0.945
- No ￿ hetero 1.4 7.8 27.6 49.3 67.5 90.6 0.70 4.0 0.945
Notes: The table shows points on the Lorenz curve and the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth. B=Y
denotes the ratio of aggregate bequests to output (in percent). In the no bequest model, bequests
are con￿scated by the government.
The no bequest model without preference heterogeneity essentially reproduces the ￿ndings of
Huggett (1996). The Gini coe¢ cient of 0:7 is somewhat smaller than in the data. The fraction of
4Wealth observations are taken from the PSID because a longitudinal dataset is required to estimate the age
pro￿le of wealth inequality in section 4.1.
8wealth held by the richest 1% of households is only 11%, compared with nearly 25% in the data.
Neither accidental nor altruistic bequests change the wealth distribution much. Bequests change
the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth by 0:01 and slightly reduce the fraction of wealth held by the richest
1% of households.5
For each of the model economies, discount rate heterogeneity has a very small e⁄ect on the
wealth distribution. The Gini coe¢ cient of wealth is increased by less than 0:01 and the fraction
of wealth held by the richest 1% of households is almost unchanged.
This ￿nding di⁄ers strikingly from KS￿ s. In their model, the same amount of preference het-
erogeneity increases the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth by a much larger amount. The intuition for this
result is important. In the models without altruism, one reason is that sel￿sh parents do not wish
to accumulate large estates over several generations. In the altruism model, the di⁄erence arises be-
cause households in KS￿ s model are relatively patient. With homogeneous preferences, the discount
rate is close to the interest rate. Households behave as bu⁄er stock savers (￿jR < 1; see Carroll
1997), but barely so. Introducing a small amount of preference heterogeneity then qualitatively
changes the saving behavior of the most patient households, who are no longer bu⁄er stock savers
(￿JR > 1). As a result, these household accumulate large amounts of wealth relative to the less
patient bu⁄er stock households.
In my model, a larger amount of preference heterogeneity is needed to prevent the most patient
households from behaving as bu⁄er stock savers. The reason is that, compared with KS￿ s model,
households face additional savings motives and are therefore more impatient (￿R is further below
1). In KS, households face relatively little earnings risk. The shocks in their model are either small
(2% productivity shocks) or transitory (employment shocks that last on average for 2 quarters). As
a result, households hold very little precautionary wealth (see KS￿ s table 2). In my model, earnings
shocks are nearly permanent, so that households hold more wealth for self-insurance. In addition,
my model features saving for retirement consumption, whereas KS￿ s households do not retire.
Since both precautionary and life-cycle wealth are larger in my model, a lower ￿ ￿ is needed to
match the size of aggregate wealth. With a small amount of discount rate heterogeneity, even the
most patient households remain bu⁄er stock savers. More patient agents hold larger bu⁄er stocks
(and more retirement wealth) than the less patient ones. But, in contrast to KS, they do not
accumulate very large amounts of wealth over the course of several generations. In addition, even
impatient households hold more wealth than in KS in order to self-insure against retirement and
earnings shocks. This further compresses the wealth distribution.
A simple experiment con￿rms this intuition. The experiment eliminates retirement from the
model and imposes a ￿ at age labor-endowment pro￿le h(a): In addition, the experiment reduces
the size of the earnings shocks. Speci￿cally, I assume that the household￿ s labor endowment equals
one with probability 0:93 and 0:5 with probability 0:07. This approximates KS￿ s "unemployment"
shocks.6 In the altruism case, the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth equals 0:38 with homogeneous pref-
erences, but it increases to 0:61 with heterogeneous preferences. Eliminating life-cycle saving and
most earnings risk dramatically increases the impact of discount rate heterogeneity on the wealth
distribution.
To summarize, Krusell and Smith￿ s ￿ndings suggest that a small amount of discount rate het-
erogeneity is su¢ cient to generate a large amount of wealth inequality. This result is sensitive
to the amount of precautionary and life-cycle wealth held by households. If agents face realistic
uncertainty about future earnings, the e⁄ects of preference heterogeneity are substantially reduced.
5Whether bequests increase or reduce wealth inequality is debated in the literature (e.g., Gokhale et al. 2001;
Laitner 2002; De Nardi 2004).
6Because the model period in KS￿ s model is shorter, even i.i.d. shocks are more persistent than KS￿ s unemployment
shocks.
93.1 The E⁄ects of Discount Rate Heterogeneity
To see how discount rate heterogeneity a⁄ects wealth inequality, it is necessary to study a case
with more heterogeneity. I repeat the previous experiment with a single change: the gap between
patient and impatient households is increased ten-fold. That is, I set ￿j = ￿ ￿ ￿ (0:97;1;1:03). This
experiment, labeled KS2, yields three results:
1. Discount rate heterogeneity can yield sizeable changes in the wealth distribution.
2. The e⁄ects of discount rate heterogeneity are magni￿ed if parents are altruistic and if prefer-
ences are intergenerationally persistent.
3. Even in cases where preference heterogeneity has only small e⁄ects on the wealth distribution,
the age pro￿le of wealth inequality changes in a way that can be exploited to estimate the
distribution of discount rates.
Table 3 shows the wealth distributions implied by the six model economies. Without intended
bequests, the ￿ndings are similar to experiment KS1. Discount rate heterogeneity has only a small
impact on the wealth distribution. The Gini coe¢ cient increases slightly as more (impatient)
households hold little wealth.
Altruistic bequests magnify the e⁄ects of discount rate heterogeneity. The Gini coe¢ cient of
wealth increases by 0:08 and the fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% of households rises by
nearly 0:07. These ￿ndings suggest that preference heterogeneity may be an important source of
wealth inequality, if some households are so patient that they do not behave as bu⁄er stock savers.
In addition, households must leave bequests, so that large estates can be accumulated over several
generations.
Table 3: Wealth distribution. Experiment KS2.
40.0 60.0 80.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 Gini B/Y ￿ ￿
Data 1.1 7.7 24.2 40.5 54.4 75.6 0.75 2.6 n/a
No bequests 1.4 7.8 27.0 47.9 65.2 89.0 0.71 2.2 0.953
- No ￿ hetero 1.8 8.8 28.4 49.3 66.3 89.7 0.70 2.2 0.969
Accidental bequ. 1.4 8.0 27.5 48.5 66.0 89.3 0.71 1.9 0.951
- No ￿ hetero 1.9 9.5 29.9 50.9 68.0 90.5 0.69 1.9 0.962
Altruism 0.5 4.1 18.9 38.3 56.5 83.9 0.78 4.1 0.950
- No ￿ hetero 1.4 7.8 27.6 49.3 67.5 90.6 0.70 4.0 0.945
Notes: See table 2.
The ￿nding that altruism magni￿es the role of discount rate heterogeneity is sensitive to the
intergenerational persistence of preferences, which is governed by the parameter p1. Table 4 ex-
plores the interaction between bequests and intergenerational persistence. Results are shown for
alternative bequest motives and for values of p1 between 0.1 and 0.9. For each case, the table shows
how discount rate heterogeneity changes the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth and fraction of wealth held
by the richest 1% of households.
The main point of the table is that large changes in the wealth distribution only occur if
households are altruistic and if discount rates are intergenerationally persistent. Without intended
bequests, preference persistence plays only a small role. The change in the Gini coe¢ cient for
p1 = 0:9 is at most 0:01 higher than for p1 = 0:9. Similarly, without preference persistence,
altruism plays only a small role. However, if altruism and preference persistence are both present,
the Gini coe¢ cient can rise by as much as 0:13.
10The intuition is that families can acquire large amounts of wealth by accumulating larger and
larger estates over several generations. This only happens if parents wish to leave large bequests,
i.e., they are patient and altruistic, and if a family contains several consecutive generations of
patient individuals. If either feature is missing, large inheritances are consumed rather than passed
on to the next generation.
Table 4: Bequests and intergenerational preference persistence. Experiment KS2.
(a) Changes in the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth.
p1 = 0:1 p1 = 0:5 p1 = 0:9
No bequests 0.01 0.01 0.01
Accidental bequ. 0.02 0.02 0.03
Altruism 0.03 0.07 0.13
(b) Changes in the shares of wealth held by the richest 1% of households.
p1 = 0:1 p1 = 0:5 p1 = 0:9
No bequests 0.01 0.01 0.01
Accidental bequ. 0.01 0.01 0.02
Altruism 0.02 0.07 0.10
Notes: The table shows the e⁄ects of varying the intergenerational persistence of preferences (p1)
and the bequest motive. Panel (a) shows the changes in the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth due to
discount rate heterogeneity. Panel (b) shows the changes in the shares of wealth held by the
richest 1% of households. Each entry is the di⁄erence between the models with heterogeneous and
homogeneous preferences.
Wealth inequality and age. How discount rate heterogeneity changes wealth inequality within
age groups is shown in ￿gure 1. For each model economy, the ￿gure shows the Gini coe¢ cients of
wealth for households of a given age. Each panel shows three lines representing the model with
and without discount rate heterogeneity and empirical estimates based on PSID data (see section
4.1 for details on the data).
Figure 1 shows that discount rate heterogeneity increases wealth inequality, especially among
the old. Importantly, the Gini coe¢ cients change signi￿cantly, even in cases where preference
heterogeneity has little impact on overall wealth inequality. This motivates the estimation approach
of the paper: the distribution of unobserved preference parameters is estimated from the age pro￿le
of wealth inequality.
To see the intuition underlying ￿gure 1, consider a deterministic version of the model in which






￿￿ = ￿j R: (9)
Among households with identical discount rates, age consumption pro￿les are parallel and
proportional to lifetime incomes. The factor of proportionality depends only on age and on the
preference type (j). Since retirement wealth ￿nances retirement consumption (abstracting from
government transfers), retirement wealth is also proportional to lifetime income. The ratio of re-
tirement wealth to lifetime income only depends on j and is higher for more patient households. As
a result, preference heterogeneity increases wealth inequality among households in or close to retire-
ment. Among young households, the bu⁄er stock motive dominates saving decisions (Gourinchas
and Parker 2002). Preference heterogeneity then increases wealth inequality for two reasons, First,
7The working paper version of Charles and Hurst (2003) works out such a model

























































Figure 1: Gini coe¢ cients of wealth within age groups. Experiment KS2.
more patient households desire larger bu⁄er stocks. Secondly, higher wealth inequality among the
old increases the inequality of inheritances received by the young.8
4 Preference Heterogeneity and Wealth Inequality
This section presents the paper￿ s main results. The idea is to estimate the distribution of discount
rates from the age pro￿le of wealth inequality.
To implement this idea it is desirable to generalize the symmetric three state preference distri-
bution of the previous section. As a tractable approximation of a general distribution, I assume
that ￿j lies on a grid:
￿j = 0:96 ￿ (0:94;0:97;0:99;1;1:01;1:03;1:06) (10)
The grid is narrowly spaced around the discount factor for the case without preference heterogeneity
8The Euler equation (9) suggests and alternative estimation approach which exploits that discount rates determine
the age pro￿le of consumption inequality. However, consumption inequality is not strongly a⁄ected by preference
heterogeneity, except for households near retirement. Estimating preference parameters from the age pro￿le of
consumption inequality would therefore provide only weak identi￿cation.
12(near 0:96) so that the algorithm can choose very small amounts of heterogeneity. At the same
time, the gap between the most patient and the least patient preference class is more than twice
the gap estimated by Lawrance (1991). The transition matrix Pj is chosen so that the model best
matches a capital-output ratio of 3.1 and the observed age pro￿le of the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth.




















The ￿rst term represents the deviation from the observed capital-output ratio. The second term is
the average absolute deviation between the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth at age a in the model versus
the data. The Gini coe¢ cients are calculated for 8 equally spaced ages between 23 and 63. The
weights used in the loss function ensure that the model￿ s capital-output ratio is close to the data.
To reduce the number of calibrated parameters, a simple form of intergenerational preference
persistence is imposed. With probability pIG = 0:5 the child inherits the parent￿ s value of ￿j.
Otherwise, the child draws ￿j with probability !j. The sensitivity analysis explores alternative
values of pIG. Table 5 shows the stationary distribution of preference parameters for each bequest
motive. All other model parameters are chosen as described in section 2.6. This experiment is
labeled WA.
Table 5: Stationary distribution of discount factors. Experiment WA
0.90 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.99 1.02 Avg.￿
No bequests 24.8 8.5 17.6 7.8 10.6 19.1 11.6 0.955
Accidental bequ. 17.5 9.4 16.8 22.4 19.7 13.6 0.6 0.952
Altruism 2.2 80.8 7.3 3.2 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.935
Notes: The table shows the fraction of households endowed with each level of ￿j. Avg. ￿ is the
mean discount factor across all households.
4.1 Data: Wealth Inequality by Age
This section describes how the age pro￿le of the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth is estimated. In cross-
sectional data, the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth are roughly ￿ at over the age range 25 to 65 with a peak
around age 20 (Diaz-Giminez et al. 1997; Budria et al. 2002). However, to be comparable with
the model economies, the data should be drawn from a source that does not oversample the rich,
such as the PSID. Moreover, cohort e⁄ects need to be removed to isolate the changes in inequality
as cohorts age.
Since estimates of this kind have not appeared in the literature, I construct new estimates based
on the 1968 to 1999 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). My measure of wealth is
the variable WEALTH2 from the PSID￿ s wealth supplement. It includes ￿nancial assets, durables,
and real estate net of any debts. It does not include pension wealth. Wealth is observed in 1984,
1989, 1994, and 1999.
Households are divided into ￿ve-year cohorts according to the birth year of the household head.
For each cohort-year cell containing at least 50 observations, I calculate the Gini coe¢ cient of
wealth. Figure 2 plots these Gini coe¢ cients against the mean age of the head in each cell. Gini
coe¢ cients clearly fall with age from near 0.9 around age 25 to 0.6 around age 65.
To disentangle age and cohort e⁄ects, I regress each cell￿ s Gini coe¢ cient on age, age2, and
on cohort dummies. The solid line in ￿gure 2 shows the predicted age-Gini pro￿le for the default
cohort born in 1936 (who retires near the end of the wealth data). Wealth inequality declines as
cohorts age. The Gini coe¢ cients drop from 0.87 at age 25 to 0.65 at age 60 and level o⁄thereafter.
13In what follows, I take these predicted Gini coe¢ cients as representing the data. My ￿ndings are
consistent with Menchik and Jianakoplos (1993) who estimate age e⁄ects for households in the
National Longitudinal Surveys starting at age 45.
























Figure 2: Gini coe¢ cients of wealth by age. PSID data.
4.2 Results
This section presents the main ￿ndings of the paper. For each bequest motive, I compute model
economies with and without discount rate heterogeneity. Comparing the implied wealth distribu-
tions yields a measure of the contribution of preference heterogeneity to wealth inequality.
The age pro￿le of wealth inequality. Figure 3 shows how successful the model economies are
at matching the observed age pro￿les of wealth inequality.
Consider ￿rst the models without intended bequests in panels (a) and (b). With homogeneous
preferences the ￿ndings resemble those of Huggett (1996). Wealth inequality is too high among the
young and too low among the middle aged and the old. In the no bequest model, wealth inequality
is very high among the young because all agents start life without assets. Since age earnings pro￿les
are initially rising with age, only those receiving very good labor endowment shocks save positive
amounts. Therefore, among the young very few agents hold positive wealth.
Accidental bequests reduce wealth inequality among the very young, re￿ ecting the distribution
of inheritances. Wealth inequality rises early in life as some households consume their inheritances
while others do not because they receive positive earnings shocks. As households age, the retirement
saving motive takes over, most households accumulate wealth, and the Gini coe¢ cients decline
(Gourinchas and Parker 2002). In sum, the no bequest model and the accidental bequest model
imply too much wealth inequality among the young and too little wealth inequality after middle
age.
For the reasons discussed in section 3, preference heterogeneity increases inequality, especially
among the old. It therefore helps the model to match the data. Especially the no bequest model
then comes quite close to matching the observed age pro￿le of Gini coe¢ cients.
The ￿ndings for the altruistic model resemble those of the accidental bequest case, except for
14the e⁄ect of preference heterogeneity on wealth inequality among the young. In the accidental
bequest model, wealth inequality increases mainly among older households. In the altruistic case,
the change in wealth inequality is roughly the same at all ages. Inequality increases even among
the young because inheritances are larger and more unequally distributed.
As a result, preference heterogeneity widens the gap between the model and the data before
age 40. This is the reason why the calibration algorithm chooses a relatively small amount of
heterogeneity for the altruistic model (see table 5).
It may appear at ￿rst that the model should be able to match the age pro￿le of wealth inequality
exactly, at least if the preference grid is ￿ne enough. The altruism model illustrates why this is
not the case. It implies cross-age restrictions which limit the wealth distributions the model can
generate. Since preference heterogeneity increases inequality among young and old households, it
is not possible to match inequality among the old without overstating inequality among the young.

























































Figure 3: Age pro￿le of wealth Gini coe¢ cients. Experiment WA.
Wealth inequality. The e⁄ect of preference heterogeneity on the cross-sectional wealth distrib-
ution is shown in table 6. For each model economy, the table shows points on the Lorenz curve of
wealth and the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth for the cases of homogeneous and heterogeneous discount
rates.
For all bequest motives, preference heterogeneity increases wealth inequality. The Gini coe¢ -
15Table 6: Wealth distribution. Experiment WA.
40.0 60.0 80.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 Gini B/Y
Data 1.1 7.7 24.2 40.5 54.4 75.6 0.75 2.6
No bequests 0.2 3.8 20.0 40.8 59.4 86.0 0.77 2.4
- No ￿ hetero 1.8 8.8 28.4 49.3 66.3 89.7 0.70 2.2
Accidental bequ. 0.6 5.6 23.6 44.6 62.6 87.5 0.74 1.9
- No ￿ hetero 1.9 9.5 29.9 50.9 68.0 90.5 0.69 1.9
Altruism 0.3 2.8 14.7 31.7 48.9 77.4 0.82 4.2
- No ￿ hetero 1.4 7.8 27.6 49.3 67.5 90.6 0.70 4.0
Notes: See table 2. The distribution of discount rates is estimated from the age pro￿le of wealth
inequality.
cient increases by 0:06 to 0:11. The fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% of households rises
between 3% and 13%. The changes are similar for accidental and no bequests, while altruism
magni￿es the changes.
Without intended bequests, the model economies generate Gini coe¢ cients that are as large as in
the data. However, the model fails to replicate the top portion of the observed wealth distribution.
Large inequality stems from large numbers of (impatient) households holding little wealth. The
fraction of held by the richest 1% of households increases by only 4% and thus falls short of the data
by more than ten percentage points. The reason is that sel￿sh parents rarely leave large bequests to
their children. Replicating the largest wealth holdings poses a challenge for many life-cycle models
(e.g., Castaneda et al. 2003).
The altruism model, by contrast, nearly matches the fraction of wealth held by the richest
households. The intuition is that patient families can acquire large amounts of wealth over several
generations. The model generates too much overall wealth inequality as measured by the Gini
coe¢ cient. This is due to the fact that many households hold very little wealth. The poorest 60%
of households hold only 2:8% of wealth, compared with 7:7% in the data.
The ￿nding that altruism magni￿es the e⁄ects of discount rate heterogeneity is sensitive to
the degree of intergenerational preference persistence. Table 7 summarizes the interaction between
bequests and intergenerational preference persistence. Results are shown for alternative bequest
motives and for values of pIG between 0 and 0.9. Recall that pIG denotes the probability of
children inheriting their parents￿preferences. For each case, the table shows shows how discount
rate heterogeneity changes the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth and the fraction of wealth held by the
richest 1% of households.
The ￿ndings are resemble those of experiment KS2. In the cases without altruism, intergen-
erational preference persistence has only small e⁄ects. The intuition is once again that intergen-
erational preference transmission can be important because it allows some families to build large
estates over several generations. This does not happen unless parents are su¢ ciently altruistic
towards their children.
Altruism always magni￿es the e⁄ects of discount rate heterogeneity. However, setting pIG = 0
largely eliminates the magnifying e⁄ect of altruism. The changes in the Gini coe¢ cient are then very
similar in the altruistic and the accidental bequest case. By contrast, when preferences are strongly
persistent (pIG = 0:9), altruism leads to much larger changes. The Gini coe¢ cient of wealth rises
by 0:15, compared with 0:06 in the accidental bequest model. The fraction of wealth held by the
richest 1% of households rises by 0:29, compared with only 0:03 with accidental bequests.
Reliable evidence regarding the intergenerational persistence of discount rates does not exist.
Some insight may be gained by comparing the model￿ s intergenerational persistence of wealth
16Table 7: Bequests and intergenerational preference persistence. Experiment WA.
(a) Changes in the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth.
pIG = 0:0 pIG = 0:5 pIG = 0:9
No bequests 0.07 0.07 0.07
Accidental bequ. 0.07 0.06 0.06
Altruism 0.08 0.11 0.15
(b) Changes in the shares of wealth held by the richest 1% of households.
pIG = 0:0 pIG = 0:5 pIG = 0:9
No bequests 0.04 0.04 0.04
Accidental bequ. 0.04 0.03 0.03
Altruism 0.08 0.13 0.29
Notes: The table shows the e⁄ects of varying the intergenerational persistence of preferences
(pIG) and bequest motives. Panel (a) shows the changes in the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth due to
discount rate heterogeneity. Panel (b) shows the changes in the fractions of wealth held by the
richest 1% of households. Each entry is the di⁄erence between the models with heterogeneous and
homogeneous preferences.
with empirical estimates. Mulligan (1997) estimates intergenerational persistence by regressing the
logarithm of child wealth on the logarithm of parental wealth and obtains coe¢ cients between 0.4
and 0.5. Table 8 shows the corresponding wealth persistence coe¢ cients for the model economies.
Wealth is observed at age 40, which is within the age ranges typical for empirical studies. The
results are not sensitive to this age.
The model￿ s wealth persistence coe¢ cients are consistent with the data for pIG around 0:5. In
the altruistic case, even pIG = 0 yields an intergenerational persistence coe¢ cient within Mulligan￿ s
range of empirical estimates. By contrast, when discount rates are strongly persistent (pIG = 0:9),
all models imply too much wealth persistence. Note that pIG = 0:9 implies an extreme degree of
persistence: families typically remain in the same preference state for several hundred years. My
preferred calibration therefore sets pIG to 0.5 or less, in which case the model determines the e⁄ects
of discount rate heterogeneity with some precision.
Table 8: Intergenerational wealth persistence. Experiment WA.
pIG = 0:0 pIG = 0:5 pIG = 0:9
No bequests 0.10 0.45 0.66
Accidental bequ. 0.27 0.46 0.58
Altruism 0.41 0.56 0.63
Notes: The table shows the coe¢ cients of a regression of the logarithm of child wealth at age 40
on the logarithm of parental wealth at age 40.
The altruism model features the strongest plausible bequest motive, where parents attach as
much weight to their children￿ s consumption as they do to their own. As a result, bequests in the
model are likely larger than in the data. Empirical estimates place the ratio of aggregate bequests
to output between 1% and 2.65% (Gale and Scholz 1994). In the model, bequests are between 4%
and 4:5% of output, depending on the value of pIG. However, altruism has a similar magnifying
e⁄ect when it is weaker (e.g.,   = 0:5) so that aggregate bequests are closer to the data (around
3:5% of output). The reason is that the estimated degree of discount rate heterogeneity is larger
when altruism is weaker.
The ￿ndings di⁄er strikingly from those of Krusell and Smith (1998). Even though the degree
17of preference heterogeneity is far larger than in their experiment, the changes in wealth inequality
are far smaller. Recall that ￿j di⁄ers by only 0.6% between the most patient and the least patient
household in Krusell and Smith￿ s model. Moreover, preferences are not strongly persistent across
generations.9 Yet the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth increases by more than 0.5. In the experiment
of table 6, the gap in ￿j is an order of magnitude larger while the Gini coe¢ cient increases by
at most 0:13 (unless preferences are far more persistent than in KS). The reason for the smaller
e⁄ects found here is that households save more for retirement and for precautionary reasons (see
the discussion in section 3).
Summary. The ￿ndings presented in this section suggest that discount rate heterogeneity ac-
counts for a non-trivial share of wealth inequality. The quantitative results depend on the inter-
action of altruism and intergenerational preference persistence. Unless discount rates are highly
persistent across generations, preference heterogeneity increases the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth by
0:06 to 0:11. The share of wealth owned by the richest 1% of households increases by 0:03 to
0:13. Larger changes are possible, if preferences are highly persistent across generations. However,
the model then implies too much intergenerational wealth persistence and too much overall wealth
inequality.
4.3 Replicating the cross-sectional wealth distribution
The previous section showed that discount rate heterogeneity helps account for the largest wealth
holdings, but at the expense of pushing too many households towards zero wealth. It is useful
to ask whether a model with preference heterogeneity could be more successful at matching the
distribution of wealth, if preference parameters were chosen in a di⁄erent way. To address this
question, this section considers the case where the distribution of discount rates is chosen to match
points on the Lorenz curve for wealth.
The experiment, labelled WD, di⁄ers from experiment WA only in the loss function minimized


























The ￿rst term denotes the deviation from the observed capital-output ratio. The second term is
the deviation from the overall Gini coe¢ cient of wealth. The third term is the average absolute
deviation from points on the Lorenz curve for wealth. CFp denotes the fraction of wealth held
by the poorest p percent of households in the model. CFD
p is the data counterpart of CFp. The
percentiles p are the ones shown in table 6. The stationary distributions of preference parameters
that minimize the loss function are shown in table 9.
Table 9: Stationary distribution of discount factors. Experiment WD.
0.90 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.99 1.02 Avg.￿
No bequests 13.7 8.6 8.8 10.2 47.1 0.5 11.1 0.96
Accidental bequ. 10.3 11.9 28.9 25.5 14.4 5.5 3.5 0.95
Altruism 14.3 30.6 51.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.94
Notes: See table 5. Preference parameters are estimated from the Lorenz curve for wealth.
Results. Table 10 compares the wealth distributions of the model economies with and without
discount rate heterogeneity. For the models without intended bequests, the ￿ndings are similar to
9Recall that a preference state lasts on average for one generation in KS.
18experiment WA (see table 6). Preference heterogeneity increases the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth by
0:05 to 0:06. The fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% of households rises by 0:03 to 0:05. The
model once again comes close to matching the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth, but it generates too many
wealth poor households and too few wealth rich households.
In contrast to the case where preference parameters are chosen to match the age pro￿le of wealth
inequality, altruistic bequests do not magnify these changes. The reason is that the loss function
now penalizes preference distributions that push too many households towards zero wealth. When
preference parameters are estimated from the age pro￿le of wealth inequality, the model succeeds in
generating rich households, but this comes at the expense of overstating wealth inequality. With the
loss function (12), the calibration algorithm avoids generating many poor households by reducing
the fraction of very impatient individuals. To hold aggregate wealth constant at the target capital-
output ratio, it is then necessary to reduce the fraction of very patient households as well, which
lowers the fraction of wealth held by the richest households.
In sum, even if the distribution of discount rates is chosen to match the cross-sectional wealth
distribution, the model does not perform much better than it does when discount rates are estimated
from the age pro￿le of wealth inequality.
Some readers have questioned this ￿nding and argued that the model should trivially replicate
the observed wealth distribution. For each wealth observation in the data, it should be possible to
construct a model household (choose a ￿) who holds exactly the right amount of wealth.10 However,
this procedure fails to ensure that the distribution of preference parameters is age invariant. The
model implies cross-age restrictions that limit the set of wealth distributions it can generate, even
if age invariance is the only restriction placed on the distribution of discount factors.
Table 10: Wealth distribution. Experiment WD.
40.0 60.0 80.0 90.0 95.0 99.0 Gini B/Y
Data 1.1 7.7 24.2 40.5 54.4 75.6 0.75 2.6
No bequests 0.5 5.1 22.2 42.9 61.0 86.7 0.75 2.3
- No ￿ hetero 1.8 8.8 28.4 49.3 66.3 89.7 0.70 2.2
Accidental bequ. 0.6 5.3 22.2 42.3 60.0 85.3 0.75 2.0
- No ￿ hetero 1.9 9.5 29.9 50.9 68.0 90.5 0.69 1.9
Altruism 0.6 5.0 22.0 43.0 61.5 86.4 0.75 4.2
- No ￿ hetero 1.4 7.8 27.6 49.3 67.5 90.6 0.70 4.0
Notes: See table 2. Preference parameters are estimated from the Lorenz curve for wealth.
4.4 Wealth and Lifetime Earnings
One motivation for studying preference heterogeneity stems from evidence indicating that observa-
tionally similar households hold very di⁄erent amounts of wealth (Venti and Wise 2000). Hendricks
(2004) shows that this evidence poses a challenge for life-cycle models. Such models imply a far
tighter relationship between lifetime earnings and wealth at the start of retirement than is observed
in the data. Conversely, wealth inequality among model households with similar lifetime earnings is
far smaller than observed. This section studies whether discount rate heterogeneity helps account
for large wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime earnings.
As a summary of the data, consider two statistics that characterize the joint distribution of
retirement wealth and lifetime earnings:
1. CWE denotes the correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth.
10Samwick (1998) uses such an approach to determine the distribution of preference for his model.
192. Ginij denotes the Gini coe¢ cient of retirement wealth among households in the jth lifetime
earnings decile.
Lifetime earnings are de￿ned as the discounted present value of earnings up to age 65. Retire-
ment wealth is de￿ned as household net worth at age 65 (see Hendricks 2004 for details on the
data). The motivation for studying retirement wealth is that earnings shocks have been realized
at age 65. This mitigates concerns that wealth inequality may be due to expectations of future
earnings growth.
Results. Table 11 shows CWE and the average of Ginij over all lifetime earnings deciles for the
data (from Hendricks 2004) and the model economies with alternative bequest motives. Prefer-
ence parameters for the models are estimated from the observed age pro￿le of wealth inequality
(experiment WA).
The model economies with homogeneous preferences share the shortcomings discussed in Hen-
dricks (2004). The correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth is above 0:9, com-
pared with 0.5 in PSID data. Wealth inequality within lifetime earnings deciles is far smaller than
in the data.
Table 11: Retirement wealth and lifetime earnings. Experiment WA.
CWE Gini R90=20
Data 0.50 0.58 2.00
No bequests 0.71 0.55 13.37
- No ￿ hetero 0.96 0.27 5.02
Accidental bequ. 0.73 0.53 13.64
- No ￿ hetero 0.93 0.35 6.62
Altruism 0.49 0.65 19.67
- No ￿ hetero 0.91 0.42 17.38
Notes: The table shows summary statistics characterizing the joint distribution of retirement
wealth and lifetime earnings. CWE is the correlation between retirement wealth and lifetime
earnings. Gini denotes the average Gini coe¢ cient of retirement wealth within lifetime earnings
deciles. R90=20 = x9=x2 where xi is the ratio of median retirement wealth to lifetime earnings for
households in the ith lifetime earnings decile.
The intuition may be obtained from a deterministic life-cycle model in which the permanent
income hypothesis holds. In such a model, lifetime earnings and retirement wealth are perfectly
correlated. The Gini coe¢ cient of wealth among households with identical lifetime earnings is zero.
Uninsured earnings shocks break the perfect correlation between lifetime earnings and wealth.
However, households have su¢ cient consumption smoothing opportunities over a long life-cycle to
maintain a very high correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth.
Preference heterogeneity weakens the relationship between lifetime earnings and retirement
wealth. The intuition is that, for given earnings, patient households accumulate more retirement
wealth than do impatient households. In the models without intended bequests, CWE drop to
values near 0:7 and the Ginij coe¢ cients increase to levels which are quite close to the data.
Figure 4 compares the Ginij coe¢ cients implied by the model economies with the data. The no
bequest model comes particularly close to replicating the observed wealth inequality within lifetime
earnings deciles.11
11The model statstics are calculated from simulated histories for 80,000 households.
20The e⁄ects of preference heterogeneity are once again magni￿ed by altruistic bequests. With
strong altruism (  = 1), the model actually overstates wealth inequality within lifetime earnings
deciles. Consistent with the ￿ndings of section 4, altruism only magni￿es the changes when prefer-
ences are intergenerationally persistent. Otherwise, the results for the altruistic case are similar to
the accidental bequest case.12 I conclude that a simple model of discount rate heterogeneity greatly












































Figure 4: Gini coe¢ cient of wealth within lifetime earnings deciles. Experiment WA.
However, even with discount rate heterogeneity, one discrepancy between model and data re-
mains. The wealth gaps between earnings rich and earnings poor households are far too large in the
model economies. Figure 5 shows the ratio of median wealth to lifetime earnings for each lifetime
earnings decile. In the data, this ratio roughly doubles between the 2nd and the 9th decile (see the
R90=20 statistic in table 11). In the model, the wealth gap between earnings rich and earnings poor
households is far larger (R90=20 between 14 and 20).
The reason is that earnings poor households hold very little retirement wealth. These households
expect to ￿nance future consumption using transfer income. Preference heterogeneity exacerbates
this problem by reducing the discount factor of the median household in each lifetime earnings
12The details are omitted in order to conserve space.
21decile.













































Figure 5: Median wealth to lifetime earnings ratio by lifetime earnings decile. Experiment WA.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of discount rate heterogeneity for understanding wealth inequality. A
key problem is how preference parameters can be estimated from data on consumption and saving
behavior. The approach of this paper is to estimate the distribution of discount rates from the
observed age pro￿le of wealth inequality.
Imposing the estimated distribution of preference parameters on a quantitative life-cycle model
yields an estimate of the contribution of discount rate heterogeneity to wealth inequality. If parents
are not altruistic, discount rate heterogeneity increases the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth by around 0:06.
The contribution towards accounting for largest wealth holdings is modest. The share of wealth
held by the richest 1% of households rises by about 0:04, but this still falls more than 10 percentage
points short of the data.
Altruistic bequests can magnify these changes. The intuition is that families can accumulate
large amounts of wealth via bequests over several generations. For this to happen, parents must be
su¢ ciently altruistic and preferences must be su¢ ciently persistent across generations. If parents
value their children￿ s consumption as much as their own, discount rate heterogeneity increases the
Gini coe¢ cient of wealth by around 0:1. The share of wealth held by the richest 1% of households
then rises by around 0:11 and comes close to that observed in the PSID. Even larger changes
are possible, if preferences are highly persistent across generations. However, the model then has
unreasonable implications for intergenerational wealth persistence and for overall wealth inequality.
Discount rate heterogeneity also helps account for the observed relationship between lifetime
earnings and retirement wealth, which poses a challenge for life-cycle models with homogeneous
preferences (Venti and Wise 2000; Hendricks 2004). In particular, the model with discount rate
heterogeneity comes close to matching wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime
earnings.
For computational reasons, the model studied in this paper abstracts from a number of poten-
tially interesting features. (i) Preference heterogeneity could interact with other sources of hetero-
22geneity, such as access to risky assets (Guvenen 2005) or entrepreneurship. (ii) Preferences could
be correlated with permanent earnings. One reason, suggested by Knowles and Postlewaite (2003),
might be that patient households invest more in education. (iii) Preference parameters could vary
over time, as in models of habit formation (Diaz et al. 2003) or in models where households invest
in patience (Becker and Mulligan 1997). These extensions are left for future work.
236 Appendix: Computational Algorithm
The algorithm searches over distributions of discount rates (!j) to minimize the loss function (11).
For each !j the household problem is solved and the stationary equilibrium is computed.
The household problem is solved by iterating over the consumption function c(s). The household
problem is solved by backward induction, taking the current c(s) guess as the consumption function
of the child, from which the marginal bequest value is computed. The resulting parent￿ s c(s) is
imposed as the child￿ s policy function in the next iteration. The iterations continue until the
parent￿ s and the child￿ s c(s) are su¢ ciently close. A 100 point grid is used for the capital stock in
the representation of c(s).
To solve for the stationary equilibrium, the algorithm iterates over guesses for the joint dis-
tribution of inheritances, discount rates, and age 1 labor endowments. Given the distribution of
households over states at age a, the distribution at age a + 1 is computed from the household￿ s
saving function together with the transition matrices Pj and Pe. All distributions are approxi-
mated on a grid of 1,000 capital stock values. The distribution of bequests is calculated from the
distribution of households over states and the mortality rates Ps (a) and used to update the guess
for the distribution of inheritances. The iterations continue until the changes in the inheritance
distribution are su¢ ciently small.
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